By Chuppala Nagesh Bhushan Assessing Delhi's vulnerabilities and counterweight strategy after the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement Summary India's exposure to the Gulf is not uniform across sectors. Energy and remittance flows represent genuine, structural vulnerabilities that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could, in principle, use as leverage against Delhi; defence sales and diplomatic influence, by contrast, increasingly run in India's favour or are held in reserve by Gulf states rather than actively deployed. Turkey holds negligible economic leverage over India but has, since 2019, been the most consistent source of diplomatic friction, repeatedly raising Kashmir at the UN General Assembly. Saudi Arabia's institutional standing on this question — via its seat on the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir — is arguably more consequential than Turkey's, precisely because Riyadh has so far chosen not to exercise it...
By Chuppala Nagesh Bhushan A trilateral defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey looks impressive on paper. Six months of evidence suggest something narrower, and more interesting, than a new NATO WHEN THREE MEN shook hands at Al-Safa Palace on August 7th, the language they signed up to was unambiguous: an armed attack on any one of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Turkey "shall be regarded as an attack against them all." That formula, lifted almost verbatim from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, was enough to send analysts reaching for maps and headline writers reaching for "NATO of the Muslim world." Combined, the three signatories field 1.4m active troops, 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks and 340-odd naval vessels, backed by $124.4bn in annual defence spending and, in Pakistan, the only nuclear arsenal in the Islamic world. Six months on, the more useful question is not what the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement says, but what it does. The evidence, patchy ...