Hadramaut on the Edge: How a Gulf Rivalry Is Reviving Yemen’s Forgotten Front

In the arid heart of southern Yemen, the oil‑rich governorate of Hadramaut is once again becoming a flashpoint, not because of a resurgence of al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) but due to a subtle yet potent rivalry between two of the Gulf’s most powerful patrons: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have quietly begun to arm and mobilise local militias, a development that analysts describe as putting the region “on the brink of war”. The stakes are high. Hadramaut produces roughly eighty thousand barrels of crude a day, a lifeline for a country whose overall output has been crippled by a decade of conflict. Moreover, the governorate straddles the Bab al‑Mandab, the narrow strait that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, a chokepoint through which a significant share of the world’s oil passes. Any disruption there reverberates far beyond Yemen’s battered borders.

A rivalry reborn

The Saudi‑UAE partnership that underpinned the anti‑Houthi coalition has frayed in recent years. While both states share a common interest in curbing Iranian influence, they diverge on how to manage the southern provinces that the coalition helped to liberate. In Hadramaut, the divergence is manifest.

The UAE, through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the so‑called “Hadrami Elite” forces, secured a foothold in Mukalla and surrounding oil fields after driving AQAP from the city in 2016. That foothold translated into lucrative contracts for Emirati firms and a degree of political clout that Riyadh finds increasingly uncomfortable.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, has sought to preserve its own strategic depth in the south, fearing that an unchecked UAE presence could tilt the balance of power toward Abu Dhabi and, by extension, toward Tehran’s regional adversaries. Recent intelligence reports indicate that Riyadh‑backed tribal militias have begun to receive fresh arms shipments, positioning themselves near the Tarim and Al‑Mokha districts, while UAE‑aligned groups have reinforced their positions around Mukalla and the historic town of Shibam.

The human cost of a proxy tug‑of‑war

Hadramaut’s population has already endured the worst of Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. Tens of thousands were displaced when AQAP seized Mukalla in 2015, and many more fled the subsequent counter‑offensive. A fresh round of fighting would inevitably recreate those patterns, pushing civilians into overcrowded camps and stretching the limited aid capacity of UN‑OCHA and NGOs operating in the region.

Economically, the governorate’s oil fields are a fragile asset. Even a brief shutdown could shave twenty thousand barrels per day from Yemen’s output, further starving the central government of revenue and deepening the fiscal abyss that has plagued the country since the war began. The ripple effects would be felt in the wider Gulf, where investors keep a wary eye on any factor that could jeopardise the smooth flow of oil through the Bab al‑Mandab.

Geopolitical reverberations

The rivalry is not confined to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Both Turkey and Qatar have been monitoring the situation, each seeking to cultivate influence among Yemen’s myriad factions. Their diplomatic overtures add another layer of complexity to an already tangled tableau. Meanwhile, Western navies continue to patrol the Bab al‑Mandab, wary that renewed hostilities could spur piracy or threaten commercial shipping lanes—a scenario that would instantly raise insurance premiums and stir market anxiety.

Possible paths forward

Three broad trajectories loom:

1. Diplomatic de‑escalation – A high‑level meeting between Saudi and Emirati officials, perhaps mediated by the United States, could yield a joint security framework for Hadramaut, limiting proxy deployments and preserving oil production. Such an outcome would require both parties to recognise that a costly proxy war would undermine their broader regional ambitions.

2. Limited skirmishes – More likely, small‑scale clashes will erupt between rival militias, confined to oil‑field towns and tribal territories. While the humanitarian fallout would be contained, the risk of accidental escalation remains.

3. Full‑scale proxy war – The least probable but most destabilising scenario would involve open battles, artillery exchanges, and the possible entry of external actors such as Iran or Turkish special forces. Shipping disruptions and a surge in refugees would follow, dragging the conflict onto the global stage.

What to watch

• Official statements from the Saudi Ministry of Defense and the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Language emphasizing “stability” or “counter‑terrorism” in Hadramaut may mask a tacit acceptance of proxy activity.
• UN‑OCHA displacement data. Sudden spikes in internally displaced persons in the Mukalla‑Shibam corridor would be an early warning of intensified fighting.
• Maritime advisories from the International Maritime Organization concerning the Bab al‑Mandab. Notices of increased naval presence or rerouting of vessels would signal heightened insecurity.

Hadramaut’s precarious position illustrates how the Gulf’s intra‑regional dynamics can resurrect forgotten battlefields, turning local grievances into a stage for great‑power posturing. Whether the governorate slides into a limited flare‑up or spirals into a broader proxy war will hinge on the willingness of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to negotiate a shared vision for southern Yemen—or to let the sands of Hadramaut become the next casualty of their rivalry. The world, and particularly the global energy market, would do well to watch closely.