RSS and Tablighi Jamaat:The Unregistered Giants of South Asia

By  Chuppala Nagesh Bhushan

♦️India's Twin Mass Movements, Born A Year Apart, Show How Religious Revivalism Can Take Very Different Routes To Influence.

♦️What a Century of Unregistered Mass Movements Reveals About Accountability in South Asia

In 1925, in the central Indian city of Nagpur, a doctor named Keshav Baliram Hedgewar gathered a handful of young men for callisthenics, drills and discussions of Hindu civilisation. A year later and a few hundred miles north, in the dusty Mewat region, a cleric named Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi began urging lapsed Muslims to relearn the basics of their faith. Neither man could have predicted that his small initiative would grow into one of the world's largest religious or cultural movements. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Tablighi Jamaat now claim, by some estimates, tens of millions of adherents between them, the RSS concentrated in India and the Tablighi Jamaat spread across some 150 countries. Comparing them is a useful exercise in how mass religious organisation can translate into very different kinds of power.

Family resemblances

The two movements share more than a birth decade. Both emerged as responses to a sense of communal decline under British rule, one offering Hindus a programme of cultural and physical self-strengthening, the other urging Muslims back toward orthodox practice. Both rely on volunteers rather than salaried clergy or cadres, organised respectively around the daily "shakha" (a local drill session) and the "khuruj" (an itinerant preaching tour, typically lasting from a few days to four months, undertaken in small bands). Both are notably opaque about their finances and membership rolls, and both have proved remarkably durable, surviving bans, court cases and shifting governments across a century.

Where they part ways is in their relationship to politics. The RSS has spent a century building outward into public life. Its ideological progeny include the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India's ruling party, as well as trade unions, student bodies, and social-service organisations; the "Sangh Parivar," as this family of affiliates is known, gives the RSS reach into nearly every sphere of Indian civic life. The Tablighi Jamaat, by contrast, has made a virtue of staying out of politics altogether. It eschews formal hierarchy, avoids engagement with the state, and frames its mission strictly as one of individual piety, encouraging Muslims to pray more regularly and live more devoutly rather than seeking any change in law or government.

Legal grey zones

Neither organisation has ever formally registered as a single legal entity, and both exploit this ambiguity to their advantage. Indian courts have described the RSS as merely "a body of individuals" rather than a registered society, which has allowed it to avoid disclosure requirements that apply to incorporated bodies. It was nonetheless banned three times by Indian governments, briefly after Mahatma Gandhi's assassination in 1948, again after the Emergency-era crackdown of the 1970s, and once more following the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992; all three bans were eventually lifted. The Tablighi Jamaat has likewise never sought to incorporate as a single global body, instead operating through a decentralised network of regional and national markaz, or centres, that coordinate preaching circuits with little formal paperwork.

Internationally the two organisations' fortunes diverge sharply. The Tablighi Jamaat, despite its studied avoidance of politics, has been formally banned or heavily restricted in several Muslim-majority and former-Soviet states, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where governments have treated its informal, border-crossing preaching circuits as a security risk or a threat to state-sanctioned religious authority. The group also drew unwelcome global attention in 2020, when a gathering at its Delhi headquarters became an early covid-19 transmission hotspot; Indian courts later quashed most of the legal charges brought against attendees, but the episode left a lasting association in Indian media between the movement and contagion.

The RSS, conversely, has faced essentially no formal bans outside India, but it has come under growing scrutiny from foreign governments and rights bodies. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent federal advisory body, recommended in its March 2026 annual report that Washington impose targeted sanctions, including asset freezes and US entry bans, on the RSS and India's foreign intelligence agency, citing their alleged responsibility for and tolerance of severe religious-freedom violations. It was the seventh consecutive year that the commission had recommended designating India a "country of particular concern," a label the State Department has never adopted. India's foreign ministry dismissed the report as a distorted and biased characterisation built on questionable sources rather than objective facts. Congress, India's main opposition party, seized on the recommendation to argue that the RSS posed a threat to national unity, invoking the organisation's earlier ban following Gandhi's assassination. The episode illustrates a broader asymmetry: the RSS's troubles abroad are reputational and diplomatic, fought out in advisory reports and op-eds, while the Tablighi Jamaat's troubles are operational, with members facing visa blacklists, entry bans and, in some Central Asian states, criminal convictions simply for participating in its activities.

The case for registration

A strong argument can be made that both organisations should be brought under formal registration regimes, with the disclosure obligations that implies, rather than continuing to operate in the legal grey zones each has occupied for a century. The basic principle is unremarkable: almost every other organisation of comparable scale and social consequence, whether a corporation, a political party, a trade union or a registered charity, is required to name its leadership, publish its accounts and disclose its sources of funding. Size and influence, on this view, ought to come with commensurate accountability, not less of it.

For the RSS, the argument has particular force given how directly its activities feed into the exercise of state power. An organisation whose ideological progeny runs the national government, and whose affiliates sit inside education, labour and policy networks across the country, is not a private devotional society; it is closer to a political infrastructure, and political infrastructure of that scale is normally expected to disclose how it is funded and who runs it. Its own court-recognised status as a mere "body of individuals" looks less like a principled exemption and more like a legal convenience that lets it avoid scrutiny no comparably influential body would be granted. Registration would not stop the RSS from operating; it would simply make its finances and leadership a matter of public record, the same standard already applied to the political party it gave rise to.

For the Tablighi Jamaat, the case rests more on practical accountability than political power. Its informal, untracked khuruj circuits are precisely what has made it so vulnerable to blanket suspicion: because there is no central registry distinguishing genuine preaching tours from the rare bad actor, entire delegations have been visa-blacklisted, and whole countries have opted for outright bans rather than attempt selective enforcement. A formal, lightweight registration system, naming the markaz, recording who travels where, would arguably protect the overwhelming majority of ordinary participants from collective punishment, by giving governments a clear, accountable structure to engage with instead of treating the entire decentralised network as an undifferentiated risk.

The standard objections, that registration could be wielded selectively against unpopular groups, or that it would alter the voluntary character of these movements, are real but not, on this view, decisive. Most democracies already require comparable disclosure from religious charities and trusts without dissolving their religious character; what changes is bookkeeping, not belief. And the danger of selective targeting argues for procedural safeguards around how registration is administered, not for exempting the largest and most consequential organisations in the country from it altogether. If anything, the current arrangement, where the most powerful voluntary organisations in India operate under less disclosure than a corner shop, is the more anomalous outcome, not registration itself.

Reading the comparison

It would be a mistake to flatten the two into mirror images of "Hindu RSS" and "Muslim Tablighi Jamaat." One is, at its core, a vehicle for cultural and political assertion that has succeeded in capturing the commanding heights of the Indian state; the other is a deliberately apolitical missionary network that has spread further geographically but accumulated far less institutional power anywhere. Critics of the RSS point to its alleged role in communal violence, including the 2002 Gujarat riots, and to comparisons drawn by some scholars between its ideology and European ethnic nationalism; the organisation's defenders counter that it is a century-old voluntary body devoted to social service and Hindu cultural cohesion, unfairly maligned by partisan and foreign critics. Critics of the Tablighi Jamaat argue that its informal, hard-to-monitor networks can serve as a conduit, however unintentionally, for more radical currents; its defenders note that it has no political wing, no history of organised violence, and an explicit theology of quietism.

What the comparison mostly reveals is how differently religious revivalism can be channelled. Hindutva, as practised by the RSS, sought state power and largely found it. Tablighi piety sought souls, one mosque and one household at a time, and in doing so built a presence so diffuse that almost no government has found an effective way to either fully embrace or fully suppress it.

Overview Comparison

 

Aspect	RSS	Tablighi Jamaat
Founded	1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in Nagpur, India Study.com, Britannica	1926 by Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi in Mewat region, British India Wikipedia, Pew Research
Ideology	Hindu nationalism (Hindutva); India as fundamentally Hindu civilization; cultural unity of Hindus	Sunni revivalist (Deobandi tradition); personal piety, adherence to Islamic practices
Primary Purpose	Strengthen Hindu community identity, promote Hindutva ideology, nation-building through cultural assertion Social Science Journal, Official RSS Vision Document	Spiritual renewal and moral reform through da'wah (missionary activity); encourage Muslims to be more religiously observant Wikipedia
Scope	Primarily India-focused, though affiliated organizations operate elsewhere	Global movement across 150+ countries, estimated 12-80 million adherents worldwide Pew Research
Structure	Hierarchical volunteer organization with affiliate network in politics, education, labor unions Britannica	Decentralized, informal volunteer network; circuit-based preaching groups (~40 members) ResearchGate PDF

Key Similarities

1. Religious/Cultural Revival Focus: Both seek revitalization of their respective communities—RSS for Hindu culture, Tablighi Jamaat for Islamic practice
2. Grassroots Mobilization: Both rely heavily on volunteer participation rather than paid professional structures
3. Long History: Both emerged in the same era (mid-1920s) during British colonial period
4. Large Scale: Both represent massive membership bases across South Asia and beyond
5. Non-electoral Core: Neither directly contests elections themselves (though RSS has political affiliates like BJP)

Fundamental Differences

Political Orientation

• RSS: Described as "right-wing Hindu nationalist" with explicit political influence and connections to governing party (BJP); actively shapes policy discourse TRT World
• Tablighi Jamaat: Explicitly "apolitical," shuns politics, has no military wing or political agenda CounterCurrents

Target Audience

• RSS: Primarily focuses on strengthening Hindu identity, though claims work for minority upliftment through Muslim Rashtriya Manch Social Science Journal
• Tablighi Jamaat: Focused on Muslims primarily (calling fellow Muslims back to practice), with secondary da'wah to non-Muslims Wikipedia

Methods

• RSS: Cultural camps, daily "shakhas" (physical training/discipline sessions), affiliate organizations in education, social service, labor Social Science Journal
• Tablighi Jamaat: Short-term preaching tours (khuruj) lasting days to months; door-to-door visits, mosque gatherings Wikipedia

Controversies & Criticisms

RSS

• Accused of fostering communal hatred and anti-minority bias
• Alleged involvement in riots including 2002 Gujarat violence [WebSearch Results]
• Has been banned three times throughout Indian history Britannica
• Comparisons made to Hitler's nationalist vision by some critics Marxist Review

Tablighi Jamaat

• Portrayed as potential conduit for extremist ideas by critics despite apolitical stance SaveTemples
• COVID-19 stigma after Delhi congregation event (2020)—legal charges later quashed by courts Frontline
• Visas misuse allegations in Gulf countries; banned in Saudi Arabia
• Stigmatized in media coverage constructing Muslim "other" during pandemic PMC Article

 

While both organizations emerged from similar historical contexts and pursue community revitalization through grassroots mobilization, they diverge fundamentally: RSS is politically oriented with nationalist goals, while Tablighi Jamaat is deliberately apolitical and focused on individual spiritual reform. Each faces distinct controversies reflecting their different positions in the sociopolitical landscape—RSS criticized for alleged majoritarian extremism, Tablighi Jamaat scrutinized for security concerns despite its non-political stance.

Both represent significant movements influencing millions across South Asia and globally, demonstrating how religious-cultural organizations can wield substantial social impact whether through political engagement (RSS) or transnational spiritual networks (Tablighi Jamaat).

 

Global Registration & Legal Status Comparison

 

Aspect	RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh)	Tablighi Jamaat
Home Country (India) Registration	Not registered under any Indian law; recognized by courts as a "body of individuals" Indian Express	Not banned in India overall; however, Ministry of Home Affairs maintains blacklist of foreign participants (2,550+ members denied entry for 10 years) Facebook News
Legal Status Abroad	Denies operating abroad officially, but maintains affiliate/diaspora groups in USA, UK, Mauritius, Australia Scroll.in via Facebook	Operates in ~150 countries globally with varying legal status
Banned Countries	No formal country-wide bans identified; monitored by governments including USCIRF recommendation for sanctions TheLoop ECPR	Multiple bans: Saudi Arabia (2013), Russia (2009 extremist list), Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan (2013) Jamestown Foundation
Monitoring/Scrutiny	USCIRF recommended sanctions against RSS for alleged religious freedom violations (2026 report); flagged in US, UK, Australian government reports Instagram/Media Sources	Monitored in multiple Muslim-majority countries without formal bans; visa misuse allegations lead to restrictions in Gulf states EFSAS
Convictions Against Members	Limited public record of criminal convictions abroad related to organization activities	Kazakhstan: Multiple convictions for participating in "banned religious movement"; Russia dismantled affiliated cells State Department Report
Registration Requirements	Claims exemption from registration laws; operates as unregistered cultural organization; does not publish accounts or pay taxes as per own admission NewsLaundry via Facebook	Informal volunteer network; relies on voluntary funding; no central formal registration structure required across most jurisdictions ResearchGate PDF

Key Differences in Global Presence

RSS International Footprint

Characteristic	Details
Official Position	Publicly denies operating outside India
Actual Presence	Affiliated cultural/student/diaspora groups documented in USA, UK, Mauritius, Australia
Government Recognition	Foreign governments (US, UK, etc.) flag RSS-affiliated networks
Regulatory Treatment	Generally operates without formal registration requirements; subject to scrutiny regarding immigration/funding compliance
Transparency	Does not formally publish accounts; described as "$330,000 US lobbying operation" funded externally

Tablighi Jamaat International Footprint

 

Characteristic	Details
Geographic Coverage	Active in approximately 150 countries worldwide Wikipedia
Membership Scale	Estimated 12-80 million adherents globally, majority in South Asia Pew Research
Formal Bans	Prohibited in at least 7-8 countries (Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, Central Asian republics)
Entry Restrictions	Blacklisted members barred from entering India for up to 10 years; similar monitoring elsewhere
Operational Model	Decentralized, informal circuits of ~40 volunteers conducting preaching tours

Summary Analysis

RSS:

• Functions largely without formal global registration, leveraging legal exemptions as a "body of individuals" in India
• Maintains unofficial/international presence through diaspora affiliates rather than direct branch registrations
• Faces increasing governmental scrutiny and sanction recommendations (notably from US USCIRF) but remains legally unrestricted in most countries
• Transparency concerns persist due to lack of public financial disclosure

Tablighi Jamaat:

• Operates openly across roughly 150 countries but faces significant regulatory hurdles
• Subject to outright bans in several countries (particularly Middle East, Central Asia, Russia)
• Member-level restrictions common (visa blacklisting, entry denial periods)
• Despite apolitical stance, frequently associated with security/extremism concerns by host governments
• Decentralized structure complicates formal registration but enables continued operational flexibility

 

Neither organization has comprehensive formal registration as centralized entities globally, but their experiences differ significantly:

• RSS operates through legal gray areas with minimal formal registration requirements, relying on court recognition of its status while expanding through affiliated networks
• Tablighi Jamaat maintains wider geographic reach (150+ countries vs. RSS's undocumented diaspora networks) but faces far more extensive official prohibitions and member-level restrictions

Both organizations navigate complex international legal landscapes that reflect the geopolitical tensions surrounding their respective ideologies—Hindu nationalism for RSS, Islamic revivalism for Tablighi Jamaat.